


3rd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery War in Iraq 2003



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3rd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery

War in Iraq 2003

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Editor Lt N J M Budd RHA

Acknowledgements

BAe for their kind financial support. All members of the Regiment who trustingly loaned their diaries, letters and photographs.

Published by Crest Publications, 20 Moulton Business Park, Scirocco Close, Northampton NN3 6AP. Tel: 01604 495495 Fax: 01604 495990 email: journals@crestpublications.com



Foreword by the Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel N D Ashmore OBE RHA

This book records the 3rd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery at war for the first time since World War 2. Despite all the modern technology, war is still an intensely human activity, relying on the determination, will and ability of our soldiers to see it through to a successful conclusion. When it mattered, every member of the Regiment stood up to be counted and maintained the Regiment's tradition of excellence in the most testing of environments – I believe that its many illustrious predecessors can be proud of what the Regiment achieved.

On Operation TELIC 1 (the war to liberate Iraq) the Regiment was reinforced to a strength of 970 personnel. It deployed 32 AS90s to generate the most powerful regiment in the history of the Royal Artillery. The 17 days of war fighting, between 20th March and 7th April 2003 will be engraved indelibly in the memories of members of the Regiment who lived through them - 250 kilometers of operational movement, 9,513 rounds fired by night and day and often in arduous conditions. The Battery Commanders and Forward Observation Officers of the Regiment successfully integrated fire support of all types to allow the armour and infantry to close with the enemy in a complex, urban environment. The Regiment played a key part in 7th Armoured Brigade's liberation of Basrah as well as firing for all element of 1 (UK) Armoured Division and for US forces.

There was no time for celebration or relaxation on the cessation of hostilities as, within 7 days, the Regiment had transitioned seamlessly to the infantry role, in its own area of operations, on the Al Faw peninsular. The subsequent three months of peace support operations were as demanding, if not more so, than the war fighting phase. Despite minimal training in such a role, the preparedness, professionalism and flexibility of the soldiers of the Regiment ensured a rapid return to normality for the Iraqi people on the Al Faw peninsular.

What was achieved could not have been done without those personnel from the Royal Artillery who backfilled the Regiment for war fighting operations, particularly from 26 Regiment but also from 4th, 14, and 40 regiments. In addition, our liaison elements (ANGLICOs) from the US Marine Corps became an integral part of our regimental tac group and proved to be battle winners, pivotal to mission success.

Finally, all of this would not have been possible without the support and dedication of our wives and families. I pay tribute to them.

*Commander 7th Armoured Brigade
Brigadier G J Binns
CBE DSO MC*



The Brigade's battle to liberate Az Zubayr and Basrah from Saddam Hussein's regime required the precise application of force. Our artillery was used to degrade the enemy's physical ability and mental willingness to fight. Over a sustained period, the Regiment delivered a devastating effect. The approach required a high level of technical competence, innovation and flexibility - skills that 3 RHA had in abundance.

This cohesive Regiment has always had a reputation for high standards and professional excellence. During the war and in the subsequent reconstruction of Iraq, they were magnificent.

*Commander Royal Artillery 1st (United Kingdom) Armoured Division
Brigadier A R Gregory*

Though political uncertainty about possible military action against Iraq remained right up until the days immediately prior to the conflict, the generation of credible forces, by necessity, started some months before. The manning and equipment situations in our front line units means this is a complex process in itself without the added difficulties of late decisions or adjustments to the plan. The fact that 3rd Regiment doubled in size, including adding 17/16 Battery to its order of battle, conducted training in its war establishment organisation and deployed to Kuwait against the very tightest of timetables was a great achievement in itself and positioned it ready for action when orders were given.

Chronicling the war fighting and the post conflict activities that the officers and soldiers of the Regiment engaged in will record the massive contribution they and their equipment made to the successful prosecution of operations. A war reminds all Arms of the indispensable nature of artillery and offensive support; the artillery system deployed on Operation TELIC, and AS 90 in particular, proved itself in every respect in the most demanding of circumstances - so much so that the GOC regarded it as one of his five 'battle winners'. The range, accuracy and weight of fire of the guns meant that they were much in demand across the Division, firing in support of all three Brigades as well as US allies. The target effects of the munitions and the ability of those deployed with the units of 7th Armoured Brigade to integrate these and other battlefield effects into the manoeuvre plans were much admired. As the tasks moved into post conflict activities, 3rd Regiment transitioned to



meet new challenges with determination, commitment and great effectiveness.


Success on operations ultimately comes down to individual and collective courage and performance; on that score, nobody was found wanting in truly testing conditions. Though Iraq has been liberated from Saddam Hussein, the establishment of a stable, democratic society continues. The superb performance of each and every soldier, many of whom came from elsewhere within the Royal Regiment - most especially 26 Regiment, has been a crucial part of that process. I consider it a great honour to have served alongside 3rd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery during Operation TELIC.



PREFACE

This is the account of 3rd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery's actions in Operation TELIC, the war to liberate Iraq. Told within the context of the strategic and tactical history of the operation, the book chronicles the Regiment's war. It records its preparation, deployment and patient waiting in the Kuwaiti Desert through to the launch and the Battle for Basrah. It recounts the Regiment's flexibility as it re-rolled for Peace Support Operations in the aftermath of the defeat of Saddam Hussein's Regime, and finally the recovery back to Hohne. The book is illustrated by the thoughts, images and emotions of the Officers and Men that served with the Regiment.

By their courage, professionalism and considerable good fortune, all members of the Regiment returned home to their families. In documenting this history we are reminded of those members of the coalition who did not.



the window for military operations in the desert likely to close by April and the decision to deploy a force being a political one, military planners were increasing their work rate in anticipation. For the Regiment this meant the continued work on orbats, vehicles and the review of lessons identified from the training year. The culmination of this planning was the generation of a (close to) war fighting establishment AS90 Regiment, through the incorporation of 26 Regiment RA, to form 4 Batteries each of 8 guns. On 15th January 2003, the Regiment, at almost war strength, deployed on a live fire exercise on Munster ranges. There were still no orders, but to the Regiment and its families this was the strongest indication yet of possible deployment. 5 days later on 20th January 2003, whilst still on exercise, the Regiment was warned for operations in Iraq.

With the exercise finishing on the 23rd January, the Regiment had until the 6th February to prepare the vehicles for shipping to the Gulf. Each Battery had approximately 90 vehicles, bolstered from all over the Division, to pack, repair and re-spray in desert camouflage. The orbat was bolstered by soldiers from 4 Regiment RA and 14 Regiment RA as well as 26 Regiment. Still short of the final target, soldiers were promised from the Territorial Army but with no clear indication of when they would arrive. The Regiment had grown from 470 to some 970 personnel.

For the Command element of the Regiment timings were even shorter. The Ops Officer³ deployed to Kuwait with the Planning team of 7th Armoured Brigade on the 28th January, with the Commanding Officer following on 4th February, as military plans were developed. Hohne became a hive of frenetic activity as the Regiment crammed 36 hours into every day. Training was completed; guns were sprayed, kit packed and repacked, documents checked, ships and trains loaded, arms were jabbled and for the lucky few whose body size matched that available, desert combats were issued. Most people were able to grab a few days leave to say their good byes. Steadily the Regiment ebbed its way to theatre through delays and cancelled flights and several interminable briefings.

MoD looks for more ships to ferry tanks

BY MICHAEL SMITH
DEFENCE CORRESPONDENT

The MoD went on the shipping market for the second day running yesterday looking for four more roll-on-roll-off ferries from Jan 15, suggesting that it does not expect any war to begin until the end of February.....

Daily Telegraph 30 December 2002



Waiting to fly at Hanover



Some desert combats and NBC clothing arrives



Moving to the rail

The main body of the Regiment arrived in Kuwait between 28th February and 5th March. Over the next two weeks there were, on the world stage, arguments and counter arguments, questioning the justification for military action; asking if the USA and Britain could go it alone without the backing of the UN and even suggesting that Saddam Hussein would back down. Listening to BFBS or the BBC World service, all members of the Regiment were aware of the political climate, although there was an air of professional detachment amongst the troops. The Regiment continued to train, prepare and plan as though military action was a certainty.

As each member of the Regiment arrived in Kuwait they went through the reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) procedure, logging into theatre, receiving in theatre pay cards and numerous repeat briefs about dangers, variously, of desert, roads, dogs, heat, women, chemical weapons and military police. Then there was a 2 hour bus journey North, up the Basrah Road, to the Brigade concentration area RIPPER, in the northern Kuwaiti desert. After a rest and food in the British Forces transit camp, Camp COYOTE, there was a final 4 km drive north to the Regiment's Concentration Area. Initially this was a hollow square surrounded by a sandy berm in the middle the desert. The first arrivals began to build a tented camp under the direction of the QM¹.

As the camp took shape so D and J (Sidi Rezegh) Batteries' vehicles started to arrive and by the 7th March D Battery were able to conduct a 2 day live fire exercise on Udairi Ranges 60 kms away. The next day J Battery was able to join them, firing on Udairi Ranges 24 hours after taking their guns off the ship. C Battery however, still had none of their guns and 17/16 Battery had no vehicles at all. It was unclear which ships would dock when. It was even unclear, due to cross loading after we had parted with our vehicles, what was on each ship. None the less, at Divisional, Brigade and Regimental level, plans for military action against Iraq were being developed. A second UN resolution was proposed on 7th March. Its effect was uncertain and caused the Regiment



Ammunition dumps



Unloading the ships




ARA 201

to wonder whether or not it would be given the green light. What was certain was that the desert was as likely to be as much of an enemy as the Iraqi Army. That day's sandstorms almost prevented movement and those on the night of the 17th, the worst in living memory, made C Battery's feat of getting their guns and "bombing up" by the following morning all the more remarkable.

By the 11th March the Regiment had been sanitised⁵ and the Gun Group⁶ received its first set of orders. It was all becoming real. Within 12 hours the plan had changed and it did so continuously over the coming days but, at 1600Zhrs on the 13th C and D Batteries left for Tactical Assembly Area' ODIN, fully bombed up and with battle preparation all but complete. J Battery, also ready, remained behind to be under tactical control of 7th Regimental Combat Team of the US Marine Corps, as did a frustrated 17/16 Battery, still having no equipment. The 14th was a day of visits. The CRA visited C and D Batteries giving an informative assessment of the current situation. J Battery meanwhile, creating an arch with all 8 guns, fronted the Desert Rats welcome to the Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Conway, Commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, of which 1(UK) Armoured Division was part. This time spent waiting was filled with confirmation training, and although a false alarm, the first "GAS, GAS, GAS" on the 16th vindicated this. For Commanders at every level, minds now moved to finalising the plan and Batteries carried out, in US parlance, reviews of operation capability (ROC) drills on large scale models drawn in the desert sand.

The 17th March was a landmark day. The plan was in its final stages; only J Battery were to be attached to the US Marines and so 17/16 Battery, having worked through the night to get their vehicles unloaded and bombed up, came across to join C and D Batteries. The bulk of the Gun Group was in the process of moving a few kilometres south, to TAA THOR, to allow exercising to take place out of radio silence. Plans were finalised, D and 17/16 Batteries were to support the attack on Umm Qasr and C Battery was to support 3 Commando



The CO's final address to the Regiment



The final touch to the Regimental concentration area



Waiting in Regimental concentration area




The UN Leaves.



QM's Department in the concentration area



Firing on Udari Ranges



Showers, ready the day we left!




Orders



GAS GAS GAS

NBC revision



Brigade's attack on the Al Faw Peninsular. On the political stage President Bush and the Prime Minister were holding emergency talks in Madrid. On the radio the Regiment heard that the US Embassy in Baghdad was being packed up. Then as dusk fell the UN pulled out. The convoy of white vehicles extended down the road to both horizons, many who watched felt that, somewhere, a big decision had been made.

The 18th March saw President Bush issue an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and the order was given to start taking our NAPS⁸ tablets. The Regiment knew it was going to fight, nothing but Saddam giving himself up would avert war now. Final rehearsals, liaisons and model exercises were conducted. By 1400 hrs C Battery was ordered south to link up with 29 Commando Regiment RA. That night the CRA received political clearance to put guns under US command and to allow C Battery and 29 Commando to cross onto Bubyian Island. On the 19th offensive action was confirmed. The Recce Parties moved out. D Battery and the FDC⁹ moved to AMA¹⁰ 203 just 7 km from the border, ready for the US Marine attack on Umm Qasr. J Battery and the FDC Step Up moved into position and laid the guns on the primary target, an Iraqi OP 14 kilometers away. C Battery edged around to the eastern flats of the island and prepared for the fire plan to launch 3 Commando Brigade onto the Al Faw Peninsular, clearly visible across the 17km of sea.

This was a tense period of waiting. On the 20th air operations started and 17/16 bty moved forward. Remaining in position, the Gun Group made final checks and waited for H hour to be given, taking comfort in their shell scrapes and honed NBC skills. The Iraqis now started to launch missiles at the Coalition Forces. The forward positions saw them fly past, those in the rear heard or in some cases saw them land. Saddam clearly knew attack was imminent. 3 RHA sat in the sand. It was the most powerful regiment in the history of the Royal Artillery. It was ready to fire; all that it required was an H hour.


For the Battery Tac Groups¹¹ there was a similar period of escalating preparation, with the same frustration from mal-located equipment. At one point, the Scots Dragoon



Building the rehearsal model



Target: Umm Qasr



Preparing rations



The Bridge to Bubiyan Is



J Batt Gen Conway's ad



The night the guns arrived in Kuwait was a challenge no one will forget. We had the worst sandstorm here for over 15 years. We had to collect the guns from the pick up point and drive them back to our camp. The visibility was practically zero. But with careful driving, good map reading and possibly a bit of luck, we made it safely to the ACP. I then had to find my detachment, who were waiting in the accommodation tents. We got to work. First we had to offload all the equipment that was in the back of the gun. We then proceeded to comb up with all 48 rounds of various ammo, and then re-packed the equipment. This took all night until the early hours of the morning. As daylight arrived, we lined up the guns ready to move off, when ordered.

The Diary of Sgt Jordan



Padre conducts a final prayer



2IC conducts the final ROC Drill




Guards Battle Group and C Battery Tac Group thought that they may not be ready for the start of any ground war. Indeed the plan for the 7th Armoured Brigade relief in place of Regimental Combat Team 7 from the US Marine Corps only envisaged using the First Fusiliers and Black Watch Battle Groups, with the Scots Dragoon Guards and 2 RTR Battle Groups in echelon. As the guns were to fire in support of Regimental Combat Team 7 it also meant that they, and not the Tac Groups, would be the first elements of the Regiment into Iraq. In addition, if the US predictions over the speed of their advance were correct, their role in the war was to be smaller than anticipated. On the 19th March at 6 hours notice to move, the Battle Groups of 7th Armoured Brigade, with their respective battery Tac Groups from 3 RHA, were in the Brigade forward assembly area¹², BARNSELEY, raring to go and hoping it would not be over without them. It would not. Their time was still to come.

With H hour set for the early hours of the 21st March 2003, final preparations were made. Across the whole front, Coalition Forces jockeyed into position for the ground war to begin. Then at 1528Zhrs¹³ on the 20th, just after last light, D Battery fired the Regiment's first rounds in the war to liberate Iraq. A US Marine sniper team had been compromised as they moved into position for the assault on Umm Qasr and needed to extract. Shortly afterwards, it became apparent that the 7th Armoured Brigade breach of the Iraqi border was likely to be opposed and J Battery were given orders to move and were switched back to support BC D Battery with the First Fusiliers Battle Group, who were to conduct the breach. 17/16 Battery moved across to AMA 201 ready to launch rapidly North. C Battery engaged at H-5 hrs as the assault on Al Faw was launched, firing continuously for an hour and a half, each engagement 5 rounds Fire For Effect. At first light J Battery engaged OP and border guard positions and 17/16 Battery engaged with D Battery on a fire plan to support 15 Marine Expeditionary Unit's breaching of the Iraqi border and assault on Umm Qasr. It had begun. By the morning of 21st March, the Regiment had fired over 2000 rounds.

The First Fusiliers Battle Group led the 7 Armoured Brigade advance. By 2030Zhrs on the 20th they had surged through the home berm and had taken up position on the far berm over looking Iraq; D Battery Tac Group were in support. Early the following morning they engaged with Proximity rounds to create a diversion for the Engineer breaching and bridging equipment. B squadron was through first with their FOO. The bridgehead was secured and with fire from D battery, the Black Watch Battle Group conducted a forward passage of lines supported by J (Sidi Rezegh) Battery Tac Group and started their relief in place around Az Zubayr. 7th Armoured Brigade was to conduct a relief in place with Regimental Combat Team 7 from the US Marines on the 22nd.

At dawn on the 21st March, the Regimental Recce Group, lead by the 2IC, was given clearance to cross the border and the RSM took up his position at the breach. 17/16 Battery's BRO recced a gun position on the Moon Road, between the two border berms, then returned to guide his Battery. D Battery's BRO, directly behind USMC point company, recced and secured ARA¹⁴ 208 to the North of Umm Qasr, C Battery's BRO set up the survey point at Safwan. At 1340Zhrs, J Battery were ordered through the breach, A2 echelon¹⁵ followed later. All the Batterys fired throughout the day supporting the advance of the coalition force.



ARA 203



Regimental Recce wait to cross the Breach



Firing in Iraq



The abandoned UN Border Post in the Buffer Zone



C and D Battery west of Basrah on the 23rd March



Heading north



C Battery Tac Group form up with the Scots DG waiting to move off



Crossing the Breach into Iraq; free from rubbish after the RSM made the Kuwaiti Army "do areas"

As the 22nd March dawned the advance continued, J Battery switched back to support 3/11 US Marines' attack on Az Zubayr air field. At 0400Z hrs D Battery Tac Group and the First Fusiliers Battle Group moved forward to conduct their relief in place; by 1600Zhrs it was almost complete with the Brigade taking up positions around Basrah and Az Zubayr. The Commanding Officer crossed into Iraq with Brigade Tac HQ at 0300Zhrs. D Battery moved through the Regimental Replen having fired some 1168 rounds in the first 24hrs and deployed with the FDC north of Safwan to support a 2 RTR Battle Group clearance operation. They were not required and at 1500Zhrs D Battery was ordered to move to the area of Basrah International Airport. It was a long and difficult move that took all night as the Recce Group, then the guns threaded their way through and around US Marine tanks and armoured vehicles that were extracting to the North West.

J Battery had continued to fire throughout the day. At 0817Zhrs incoming mortar fire landed within 100m of the position. The mortars were detected by the Artillery Hunting Radar (ARTHUR) and engaged by J Battery – nothing more was heard. 17/16 Battery moved through the regimental replenishment area and then into Iraq. C Battery's firepower was kept with 3 Commando Brigade as long as possible. 29 Commando's airlift across to Al Faw was completed mid afternoon and then C Battery were released. They moved by HETs¹⁷ via ARA 201, met the RSM, crossed the border at dawn on the 23rd and drove through Safwan. After a replen in Az Zubayr they joined D Battery to the South West of Basrah airport. With J and 17/16 Batterys on the edge of Shaibah Airfield, the Regimental Gun Group was now consolidated in Iraq, as it continued to fire in support of 7th Armoured Brigade.

Throughout the 23rd March, the Tac Groups and their Battle Groups pushed forward. C and D Battery Tac Groups supporting assaults on bridges over the Shatt Al Basrah Canal. J Battery Tac group supported Black Watch Battle Group operations to isolate regime elements in Az Zubayr. The previous day when the Regimental echelon had set up and C Battery had replenished, the area appeared benign, now RPG¹⁸ and small arms attacks were plentiful. The Warriors stood up to the RPG and small arms well, but in a contact in Az Zubayr, two British soldiers in a Landrover had been lost. J Battery Tac group supported D Coy 1 Black Watch's attack to secure the vehicles and check for survivors. The Iraqi Regular Army was dissolving into the civil population, what remained was the Militia and Fedayeen, who now adopted guerrilla tactics. The Battle of Basrah was about to begin.



ARA 203



(f)	(g)	(h)							
Regt or Fmn	Fire Units	-30	-25	-20	Timings		-10	-5	H
324A	D/17/16 4 Guns	AC3000 (a)	AC3001 (a)	AC3003 (b)	AC3005 (b)	AC3006 (b)	AC3017 (c)		AC3004 (d)
324A	D/17/16 4 Guns	AC3000 (a)	AC3002 (a)	AC3003 (a)	AC3005 (b)	AC3006 (b)	AC3017 (c)		AC3007 (e)
Remarks	(a) Prox 3rd, FFE (b) Conv PD 2 Rds FB 4 Rds FFE 60 Sec (c) Linear 400 Mt 2000 PD 2 Rds FB 4 Rds FFE 60 Sec (d) SMK Linear 400 Mt 2000 2 Rds FFE FB R (e) SMK Linear 400 Mt 2000 2 Rds FFE FB R								
	(c) Linear 400 Mt 2000 PD 2 Rds FB 4 Rds FFE 60 Sec HMSO Dd 934/590/02294A, 03/91, G75800, C6N32484								

The Fire Plan to open the war with D and 17/16 Batteries. FPC copy



GAS GAS GAS!



J Battery Orders



D Battery Command

The Battle for Basrah

As the final American forces handed over to the British in southern Iraq, so the Battle for Basrah took a more traditional format for the Regiment. The Commanding Officer with his staff in the FSCC¹⁹ coordinated all firepower in support of the Brigade, with the Battery Tac Groups in turn supporting their Battle Groups. The Gun Groups, now all located within 7 Armoured Brigade's boundaries, continued to provide fire to the Brigade and the Division.

Basrah was the Division's main effort, but not the Coalition's. It was assessed that its fall would not precipitate the fall of Baghdad, but that the fall of Baghdad would cause Basrah to fall. Basrah did however soak up a significant number of Iraqi Forces, which assisted the Coalition as it drew them away from other fronts. This did not affect the British, which held the Iraqi forces comfortably across the Shatt al Basrah canal. Thus 1 (UK) Armoured Division had no need to force an entry into Basrah; a holding scenario was wholly satisfactory, allowing shaping operations to set the conditions to enable the entry of Basrah when the time was right.

The shaping operations needed to demonstrate to an apprehensive local population that the regime was being targeted and would fall. Basrah was a Divisional objective tasked to 7 Armoured Brigade, so the targeting of the firepower, both of the Regiment's guns and of Coalition air forces, was conducted by the CO and the BC M(HQ) Battery in Brigade HQ. This was the Brigade "Deep Battle", mainly prosecuted with pre-planned or time sensitive precision guided munition targeting. Human intelligence (HUMINT) sources provided the information and intelligence to enable precision strikes against individual buildings. The first of these targets originated by the FSCC in HQ 7th Armoured Brigade, was the Ba'ath Party Headquarters in Basrah, struck on 24th March with two 2,000lb Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), a GPS-guided so-called 'smart bomb'. In parallel, the Battle Groups of 7th Armoured Brigade conducted ground manoeuvre raids against specific targets in and around the city, supported by the BC and FOO parties of the Regiment, who, using 1:15,000 street maps of Basrah, fired the guns with



Then it rained



Entering Basrah International Airport



The drain marshes turn into a quagmire



The QM Department, water!

Firing at Basrah International Airport



Prisoners of War



D Battery Tac Group entry into Basrah International Airport



Emotions range from fear, aggression, dog-tired and a desire to know how well the bigger picture is going. We are relying on the World Service and they are not putting the most positive spin on things. We are quite sanguine about combat now. The whole thing is rather surreal.

Extract from BC J Battery's diary




The Mortuary found by J Battery

Bridge 4





THE BATTLE





FOR BASRAH



The motorway to Bridge 2

astounding accuracy. Outside Basrah the guns switched between supporting their own Tac groups and responding to Divisional calls for fire as assets including the unmanned air vehicle, Phoenix, identified concentrations of enemy armour beyond the city.

At first light on the 24th March the Regimental Gun Group, now consolidated, moved again: C and D Batteries to a position West and just North of Basrah, and J and 17/16 Batteries to Shaibah Airfield, to the South East. Firing continued throughout the day both in support of Battle Groups and Phoenix. At this stage D Battery Tac Group with the Fusiliers Battle Group held bridges 1 to 3, having handed bridge 4 over to the Black Watch and J Battery Tac Group, who also held Az Zubayr. C and 17/16 Battery Tac Groups were in reserve with their Battle Groups. The Battle Groups now began the series of raids and fighting patrols required to dominate the ground.


The 25th March again saw the guns move at first light, due to increasing counter battery threat, all occupying their alternate positions. For J battery this was not an ideal location, as it had an industrial area 300m to its front and so it was exposed to a RPG and sniper threat. Consequently authority was sort and granted for them to move into nearby factory complex, which with its concrete walls, was readily defensible.

For C and D Batteries the new position was 1 kilometre further South, and in the middle of a drained marsh. Ordinarily this would not be a problem in the desert, however tremendous thunderstorms, gales and sand filled rain turned the gun positions into swamps. The British had bought British weather to the desert and things started to look rather bleak. After 5 days of fighting and no sign that the war was about to finish quickly, the world's media was suggesting mistakes were being made. The supposed safe areas to our rear were still too dangerous to allow single vehicle movement, especially after dark, and we were covered in mud. It all required a sense of humour.

Throughout the 25th March, D Battery Tac Group supported the Fusiliers in raids to seek out enemy strengths and search for an AA²⁰ missile firing post, whilst

J Battery Tac Group with the Black Watch continued to strike the enemy in the the Technical Collage compound over Bridge 4. This included using four 2000lb JDAMs. Throughout the day the troops at Bridge 4 received accurate incoming fire from small arms, mortars and artillery; during the night the situation became critical as the enemy attacked and no guns were available. J and 17/16 Batteries had been tasked at short notice to conduct a gun raid to support 3 Commando Brigade. Orders were incomplete and the un-recced ground proved to be a lake crisscrossed by several thin roads. By the time the recce parties had resolved the problems it was dark and J Battery BRO had rolled his 432 into the swamp. Both Batteries were now only minutes away but it was clear the Black Watch needed immediate support. The Ops Officer gave the order "Deploy Deploy Deploy" and within 10 minutes, off a track in the dark, both Batteries were firing a quick action. They subsequently deployed to their planned position and fired through the night engaging Iraqi artillery, tanks and Fedayeen.

The Tac Groups' battles continued on the 26th, as did the firing for the Guns, including targets from Phoenix. In Az Zubayr, humint had identified the Ba'ath Party and militia stronghold in the town. Based on this intelligence, 17/16 Battery's BC with the 2 RTR Battle Group planned a JDAM strike against this stronghold for the early hours of the following day. The time on target for the 11 JDAMs on eight buildings was also the H Hour for a Company/Squadron Group attack by 2 RTR. The combination of JDAMs and offensive ground manoeuvre had a devastating and decisive effect on the enemy, destroying his will to fight. This was the first time that UK conventional forces had synchronised PGM²¹ strike with ground manoeuvre. A somewhat unconventional BC's fireplan – but one that achieved its aim! In the afternoon C and D Batteries along with the FDC moved to Basrah International Airport. As the area was still a quagmire, full use was made of the runways and apron. However, within a few hours both Batteries raided north to prevent reinforcements moving into the north of Basrah. The ground was still very treacherous from the storms, and the cloud ensured there was no ambient light for the blacked out move. Several vehicles slipped and bogged in and the RTO's²² warrior, leading the raid, threw a track.



Baked Beans. Again!



Embedded reporters from Channel 5






Sorting the morale



Exhausted



Poised, Charge 8!



Exhausted Adjutant




Needing morale



Receiving morale



ACP



ACP

Striving to get as far as possible in the conditions, the guns continued until called to fire from the line of march. At first light, they arrived back in the airport exhausted.

From the 27th March a routine was established. The guns did not move location and the Tac Groups continued to support their Battle Groups on the raids. Missions were fired at regular intervals throughout the day with the guns firing in support of Tac Groups and Divisional assets. For the Battle Groups the raids were becoming more specific in their aims. The Black Watch Battle Group continued to prosecute Company/Squadron raids into the Technical College, plus of Bridge 4, and beyond. On the 30th March, a Battle Group raid pressed over 4km into Basrah and inserted Special Forces to locate a mortar line that had shelled Iraqi civilians on Bridge 4 the day before. Special Forces located three separate mortar base plates, which were then engaged and destroyed by J Battery, with no collateral damage to a nearby school.

The 30th March saw a re-organisation in the Brigade, with the Scots Dragoon Guards relieving the Black Watch at Bridge 4 and therefore C Battery Tac Group replacing J, who moved back to a fairly stable Az Zubayr. There was a general feeling that the British were now firmly in control. The Fusiliers had managed to push further into Basrah and it was considered safe enough to bring A1 and A2 echelons up to Basrah International Airport raising moral, as a gradual supply of fresh rations came through; a bread roll, an apple or a yoghurt. Anything new was an improvement on the monotony of the same menu, day in day out. For D Battery this was somewhat short lived as they were moved to reinforce CO 7 Para RHA on the 31st. A long HET move, during which detachments stayed in their guns, took the Battery over the River Euphrates to Rumaylah where the destructive power of bomblet rounds was bought to bear against armoured targets of 6 Iraqi Division soon after dark.

With Targeting becoming more specific the engagements became less frequent but included some unique missions. On the 31st March, C Battery fired a mission generated by SIGINT²³, engaging 3 Corps HQ. It consisted of 10 rounds Bomblet followed by 10 rounds HE all at top

FREETEXT

Orig: 1D :3 :C :FPC:

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PAGE 1 OF

UNCLAS

Rmks

: FAO CO and Ops Offr, fm BC C Bty RHA.
C Bty Tac Gp SITREP as at 062000 Z.

A bad end to a very successful day.

This mornings operation proved highly successful. A return to kinetic OS was timely in cracking resistance around Red 5. The combination of AS90 and COBRA (controlled by 11B and 11F), followed up by direct fire and dismantled manouvre, brought crowds from the Hayyinayah Shia Slums. These crowds were delighted. There picking over of Fedayeen posns has ensured that the latter are now clear. The Baath HQ continues to burn fiercely. As a result of this success, the BG was able to hold at Red 6 (The Gateway to Basrah).

Resistance within the F2, the Literary College, was mixed. It principally involved individuals and teams who remained hidden until a suitable tgt appeared for engagement at close range with R PG. (J11 was one of these tgts, receiving a dose of shrapnel from an impact close to the rear ideler.) A protracted operation followed, involving both coys (with 11A and 11D), to clear the College. The College had been prepared for defence with numerous R PG and rooftop sniper posns. A significant HQ complex and arms cache was found within the one of the buildings.

The College was finally cleared and occupied by 1300 hrs. Immediately after, patrolling began into the G, H, J and K areas in order to provide depth and security to the Basrah Gateway. Initially, no one sighted, the greatest concern being looting of the Main Hospital.

Shortly after last light, the PSYOPS loadspeaker team was engaged. This was followed by an engagement, within the College perimeter, which resulted in 4 casualties. It is not known whether the sniper had remained hidden within the College or had re-entered.

Operation continue to flush out the sniper within the College. 11A and 11D remain in dismantled OPs within the College. 11C is currently mounted (within a scrape) at Red 6. Patrols will continue to dominate the surrounding area. BG Tac briefly back with Main to brief 3 Para for tomorrow's FPL. It is likely to be a long night.

Operations tomorrow centre on 3 Para FPL. BG likely to bid for COBRA CAP to cover FPL. H Hr currently anticipated as 070900 Z. However, Scots DG BG likely to mount its own operation to clear the complex at 02. This complex is known to have been used by the Fedayeen to control the Shia Slums and includes a 10 story building which continues to be occupied by a controlled gp. This op would also see a request for COBRA. Likely H Hr at 070330 Z. Confirmed bids to follow through OC (SALT F having been released)

to 2(RTR BG) for control by 11F.

UNCLAS

Situation report by BC C Battery on 6th April

UNCLAS



Effects of 155mm




17/16 Battery doing essential maintenance



C Battery TAC Group with Scots DG Battle Group at a VCP on Bridge 4



RPGs



They are no match for our fire power and there are huge explosions all along our axis of advance. Buildings and enemy locations are being dropped left, right and centre. This is chaos but controlled by us.

Extract from BC J Battery's diary

FREETEXT UNCLAS
 Orig: 1D :3 :D :FPC: 031611 PAGE 1 OF

Rmks : SITREP - 1 RRF VCP on the Cloverleaf
 I have now debriefed the FOO and DC B Sqn. The Sqn intent for this op was to dominate the cloverleaf and est a VCP. Subsequently 14D (Bde Comd) agreed to allow our c/s to exploit success and a ltd per to the Naval Academy was auth. A series of v successful engagements took place - having caught the en unprepared. The e fol are confirmed kills:
 4 x T55, 2 x 23(2), 3 x D 30, 6 x Engr diggers, 7 mil trucks, 4 x 4x4 vehs, 2 x AD Guns, 3 x RPG teams, well over 30 dismantled troops plus unspec no's in depth pl posn, one x Academy + Militia HQ, 2 x GHN 45, 1 x tech veh with tps and AA Gun.
 DC B Sqn has confirmed that OS completely des the en fwd HQ and approx 30 pax. It then des the depth bldg with the en reserve with an unspec no of cas. C/S 12 conducted a first class engagement - without the aid of his Osprey sight (damaged by mortar fire), with the expert assistance of C Bty. Well done all concerned, Regards, BC D.

Situation report by BC D Battery on 3rd April

charge and was the largest individual mission of the war. Numerous illuminating missions were conducted to restrict the enemy's freedom of movement within Basrah at night. On the night of the 2nd April, 24 guns fired a 5 kilometer linear illumination mission lighting up Basrah along the canal; the same night J and 17/16 Batteries fired Bomblet into the Naval Base at Basrah destroying armour whilst still maintaining minimum collateral damage. Only the proven accuracy of the guns over the duration of the war had allowed such precision use. The effect of Bomblet was proving to be devastating. On the 3rd April 24 guns fired a Phoenix mission; of 14 tanks targeted 12 were destroyed.

D and C Battery Tac Groups continued to support their Battle groups as they probed further into Basrah. For C Battery Tac Group this involved raids into the heavily contested Technical College just east of Bridge 4. They experienced RPG, mortar and small arms fire but as they pushed further they steadily dominated the ground, much to the delight of the locals who were clearly pleased to see them. In order to minimise collateral damage, the further into the city our own troops moved, the greater were the restrictions on engaging with guns. By the 4th April, C Battery Tac group with the Scots Dragoon Guards were in the Technical Collage on the edge of the city after a successful raid. On the 5th April, they conducted a psyops²⁴ raid, using speakers strapped on an FOO's Warrior, broadcasting about the fall of the regime.

For the Guns the days were becoming less active with increasingly infrequent missions. J and 17/16 Batteries were forced to move from their good position in the factory complex on the 5th, due to the discovery of unstable chlorine cylinders. Their new position was not without its unpleasant secrets either. A swampy and grubby abandoned barracks, it held a mortuary in which 200 coffins lay, with 100 decomposed bodies and detailed records of casualties from the Iran Iraq War. The nightly illuminating missions, aimed at harassing the regime elements still operating within Basrah, were the only regular activity during this period.

Following the prosecution of a time sensitive PGM strike against key regime figures on 5th March in Basrah, a

number of human intelligence reports indicated that the militia resistance was at breaking point. Op SINBAD, based on simultaneous Battle Group raids, by the Scots Dragoon Guards and 1 Black Watch, supported by the tac groups of C and J batteries respectively, was launched early on 6th March with the aim of establishing lodgements in the city from which to conduct subsequent operations. The two Battle Groups encountered some initial resistance, but the application of AS90 and Cobra attack helicopters allowed them to break into the City, although not before one Cobra had been forced to make an emergency landing as a result of being hit by small arms fire. The Scots Dragoon Guards Battle Group found themselves engaged in fierce fighting as they cleared buildings at the gates of Basrah and sadly were to lose two soldiers killed and two seriously wounded during the course of the day. The 1 Black Watch Battle Group found the way open after overcoming initial resistance and forced their way deep into the city (working to the Brigade Commander's intent that if they were to "find the door ajar, kick it in and stay"). However, both Battle Groups encountered some fanatical resistance, with one FOO having to use his Warrior chain gun to remove militia from the turret of his Squadron Leader's tank.


Given the Battle Groups' success, it became apparent that there was an opportunity to liberate Basrah and the Brigade Commander ordered the 1 RRF Battle Group to seize the north of the city. 1 RRF, supported by D Battery tac group, quickly seized the objective, encountering some resistance that resulted in the death of one fusilier. 2 RTR Battle Group, supported by 17/16 Battery tac group, were also ordered to exploit success and conducted a forward passage of lines with the 1 Black Watch Battle Group to secure the administrative and business centre of the city. The operation had, by this stage, become a Divisional operation, with HQ 1 (UK) Armoured Division launching 3 Commando Brigade from the south of Basrah to take the Presidential Palace and to threaten from that direction. 2 RTR linked up with the Marines on the

southern edge of Basrah having cleared their part of the city. A long and difficult night ensued, with numerous contacts, but the militia proved no match for Warrior armoured fighting vehicles and Challenger tanks.

The following day, 7th March 2003, 3rd Bn Parachute Regiment, the Divisional reserve, conducted a forward passage of lines through the Scots Dragoon Guards to clear the old part of Basrah, where the narrow streets were unsuitable for armour. By this stage, the battle for Basrah was won and 3 Para were greeted by cheering crowds. 7th Armoured Brigade had liberated a city of 1.5 million, with the loss of 3 soldiers and with minimal collateral damage. Own casualties were kept to a minimum because of the overmatch capability provided by offensive support and by the protection offered by up-armoured Warrior and Challenger, although the infantry (in particular the Fusiliers and the Irish Guards with the Scots DG Battle Group) were still required to dismount and close with the enemy to clear bunkers and buildings in the city.

Briefly it was thought that 16 Air Assault Brigade may have to cross the Euphrates, and D Battery with them, but after 24 hours of no missions the CRA announced that the war for the guns was over. D Battery, who had opened the war, closed it for the Regiment firing the last rounds with an illumination mission on the night of the 7th.

It is important to note that the Gun Group could not have made it to this point without the tireless work of its echelon. The Quarter Master's Department, Quarter Master Technical's Department the REME Workshop and the Regimental Administration Office were vital in all that the Regiment did from pre deployment through to the return to Hohne. Combined, the core business of the echelons was to sustain the Regiment. Testament to their success is that, in an operation where high level logistics were much criticised, no battery was ever short of rations, water or ammunition. Having fired continuously for 17 days and frequently at maximum charge the consistently high availability of our guns (beyond all expectation) was a great testament to the fitter sections and A2 Echelon who worked round the clock to keep them on the road. Success was not due just



to work in theatre, it reflected much hard preparatory work and careful planning. Administration is rarely glamorous but it was key. Even the basic task of ensuring mail was delivered was vital. Maintenance of moral is as much a principal of war as offensive action.

British Troops storm main bridge into Basra

From Daniel McGrory on the Iraq/Kuwait border

British Troops set up camp inside Basra last night after fighting their way across the Shatt al-Basra waterway, a 45 foot canal near the southern city limits. Infantry accompanied by personnel carriers, tanks and helicopters, entered over Bridge 4, the most direct route into the centre...

..Every night as artillery and mortar rounds pour down on one of the regime's strongholds, raiding parties swoop into other locations searching for the remaining Baath party leaders. The latest capture came before dawn yesterday with an attack at the western edge of the city on an agricultural college, used for ten days as a fortress

Sensing defeat, the Iraq gunmen defending the building torched it, set fire to deep pools of oil and blew up a pipeline before trying to retreat into the suburbs. Twelve were captured and more killed.

BASRA FALLS TO THE BRITS

'We're in and we're not coming out again'

A SHY gesture of welcome from a little boy confirms that the people of Basra are finally free. The smiling soldier with him, Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Blackman, had led British forces to smash Iraqi resistance in the city yesterday. Three British soldiers died in a dramatic operation that saw thousands of people welcoming their liberators. Baghdad will be next, as the Allied noose tightens inexorably


Turn to Page 2, Col. 3



CO Scots DG and BC C Battery. - The Daily Mail

We enter the town and despite RPG, mortar and small arms the resistance is not as great as may have been expected. We have Cobra AH in support and one is brought down by the enemy fire above us. The lead squadron report a heavily defended building on the left of our axis - the tanks cannot engage. The guns fire 88 rounds and there is no need to conduct a cursory clearance.

Extract from BC J Battery's diary.



D Battery crossing the Euphrates and moving north






Peace Support Operations

The change from war fighting to peace support was not a simple transition, but within 7 days of the cessation of hostilities the Regiment had been restructured and changed its posture completely to conduct stabilisation operations in the infantry role. An aggressive war fighting stance would be counter productive as the Regiment strived to win the hearts and minds of the local population, yet force protection would remain a priority. At all levels, from Division down, the main effort was to prevent a power vacuum and restore normality.

The 8th to 10th April was a transition period. Basrah Airport was cleared to allow the Divisional HQ to move in and so C Battery and the FDC moved to the campus of Basrah University assisting in the Fusilier Battle Group's area of the City. D Battery and 17/16 Battery (who had been sent to roulement with D), where given orders and placed on immediate notice to move to Al Qurnah, in support of 16 Air Assault Brigade. However they were stood down after 3 hours and at first light on the 10th April they moved down to join C Battery in the University. J(Sidi Rezegh) Battery's forced move due to the chlorine containers had placed them in an unsavoury location and so with the departure of the Scots DG A1 echelon on the 8th they moved quickly into the vacated military headquarters over looking the Shatt al Basrah.

The Tac Groups remained with their Battle Groups for this transitional period. Looting and a state of lawlessness were now the problem and the Tac Groups assisted in the anti looting and framework patrols that were carried out to demonstrate that the Coalition was in control. For the Gun Group at the university anti looting patrols became the main effort as now the guns were put back to 12 hours notice to fire. The 11th April saw the FDC leave the University and head to the Presidential Palace in Basrah to set up Regimental Headquarters. The guns de-bombed and all ammunition was returned to the ACP. 7th Armoured Brigade now had to fight for the peace.



A bridge blown by Saddam's Militia.

Working with Imans and locals.



The Regiment returned to Shaibah Airfield on the 12th April in preparation for its new role. Tac Groups rejoined Gun Groups and Batteries then reconfigured to reflect their new infantry role. On the 13th April, a Regimental Photograph was taken and the Commanding Officer addressed the Regiment. The Padre then led a short service of thanksgiving, after which C Battery lined their kit up and leaving a small detachment behind, headed straight to the Palace to take over their new Area of Operations.

C Battery took over their area of operations (AO) from 40 Commando Regiment. It consisted of a small urban area on the edge of Basrah, including the Presidential Palace (now home to HQ 7th Armoured Brigade) and a semi-rural area to its south made up of date plantations, villages and small water ways. C Battery were tasked with forming a guard for the Palace, guarding a sewage works and manning an observation post to protect the hospital as well as patrolling their AO. The remainder of the Regiment remained at Shaibah Airfield to begin to prepare vehicles for our return to Germany. The majority of the augmentees moved to join 17/16 Battery and prepared to leave theatre.

Two days later J Battery took over the rural part of C Battery's area and on the 17th April D Battery surged to support the Fusiliers in the north of the city as an additional infantry company. The emphasis was on foot and vehicle patrols, with the aim of dominating the ground to prevent any regime or other anti-coalition groups taking power. Patrols met key local figures to initiate cooperation and convince the Iraqis that Coalition Forces were there to provide the security that would allow them to rebuild their own country. Vehicle Check Points and cordon and search operations aided the intelligence gathering efforts whilst helping to impose law and order. The biggest problem was still endemic looting. "Ali Ba Ba" was everywhere.

In Brigade Headquarters, the FSCC's responsibilities evolved to include the Brigade campaign plan (The



De-bombing the Guns



Repair at Shiabah



Anti looting raid



C Battery HQ in the Palace




Leaving Basrah International Airport.

Basrah Province Road Map) and governance. The latter was to occupy much time, as the struggle began to identify Iraqis to be involved in the governance of Basrah City and Province, not helped by the somewhat limited experience of the FSCC in the governance of a Province of over 1.5 million people! Progress was also somewhat hindered by the fact that the individual initially identified to head up the provincial governorate turned out to be a major ba'athist and alternatives had to be identified. An interim advisory council was established initially to engage with the local population while processes and other negotiations took place. The priority was to get the city and province working again and the focus was therefore on the restoration of public utilities through the establishment of a Basrah Interim Governate Committee (BIGC), a non-political body comprising Iraqi representatives of all the major utilities and departments. In parallel, an administrative or advisory council was to be established as a means of some political expression. Hours of negotiations with local clerics, political parties and other opinion formers followed, as rival groupings and power struggles emerged. Demonstrations were common place as those opposed to the plans exercised their ability to put their supporters on the streets, with the first meeting of the BIGC being disrupted by a 3,000 strong demonstration. Further negotiations continued right up to the point of the Brigade's hand over to 19 Mechanised Brigade, with things on the cusp of agreement.

On the 27th April, D Battery were given their own area of operations centred on Al Faw town, taking over from 29 Commando Regiment RA. Their main tasks were to ensure the security of the oil pipelines, as well as guard their own camp and provide a QRF²⁵. For all Batteries the transformation was enormous; from the aggressive posture of the war, soldiers were now in open top Land Rovers and berets, and interacting closely with the Iraqi people. The vast majority were pleased to see the British Army, children played football with foot patrols and everyone waved as vehicles drove past. D Battery even organised a football match in the Al Faw stadium


Arresting looters



The new Police station in Abl Al Kahsi.



Looters!



Boat Patrol

Repaired local bridge



VCP


on the 3rd May, diplomatically losing 11-2 in front of a crowd of 3000 people! It is important to note that the images of smiling children, tropical gardens and football matches can be misleading. There was still a real threat although it was hard to quantify, and in the euphoria of ending major conflict commanders had to continually emphasise that operations were still dangerous. After a relatively peaceful first few weeks reality dawned once the Regiment was shot at again.

The Regiment's operations grew in conjunction with the expansion of the area of operations and as the intelligence picture developed. Regimental Headquarters coordinated operations between Batteries and, linking with Brigade, orchestrated humanitarian aid, distribution of water, and the provision of money to rebuild schools. Offensive operations were also planned. On the 2nd May, J Battery, supported by a Troop from C Battery, conducted a raid on a lavish house complex belonging to a member of the Wahibi sect, with links to Al Qaeda. On the 4th May, a Regimental operation was mounted in conjunction with the new Iraqi Police Force to catch and deter looters on the industrial estate on the South West of the city. Thousands of looters had been stealing from government warehouses and the situation was escalating to widespread lawlessness in the area. Some 70 looters were arrested and the operation was a milestone in the development of the emerging Iraqi Police force. There were also opportunist offensive actions; D Battery capturing 8 camels that were part of a smuggling outfit.

By the 3rd May J Battery had moved to its new location in a disused fertiliser factory on the outskirts of Abu Al Khasib and on the 6th May took over the majority of C Battery's AO. C Battery continued to patrol a small urban area by the palace as well as provide surge troops. As a surge company it supported both J Battery in their AO and the Duke of Wellington's Regiment in Umm Qasr. By this stage the extraction plan was confirmed, with two thirds of the Regiment (C and D batteries, plus echelons) extracting at the end of May, while 160 personnel from the Regiment (J Battery reinforced, plus



Playing the locals



The Palace



The G1 war begins!



Liberated!


RHQ and M(HQ) elements in Brigade HQ remained until the handover to 19 Mechanised Brigade at the end of June.

On the 19th May, those members of the Regiment augmenting J Battery and Regimental Headquarters, who were to stay in theatre a month longer, moved to their

Rural Basrah

Suddenly finding ourselves in command of 20 schools, 2 police forces, 1 fire brigade, oil infrastructure and a fishing port – to name just a few of our new tasks – has come as something of a surprise. However together we were able to achieve a great deal to improve the standard of living for the local population. Mains electricity power is restored to the area, food and water distributed, hospitals provided with much needed medical supplies and schools reopened and equipped. Perhaps surprisingly the rebuilding of Iraq has been equally as satisfying as the destruction of Saddam's regime.


Extract from BC D Battery's diary



The Oil Pipe protection base in Al Faw




Basrah slums



Pulling down the remnants of the Regime




Abandoned small arms dump



The Oil Pipe at Al Faw

Meeting with locals shopping in Abi Al Kabsib



Rounding up weapons




3 RHA Warrior standing guard in Basrah, Matthew Cook Times war artist



ON A HOT NIGHT IN SADAMS PALACE.SGT CAMERON, BDR WHILES, GNR'S JONES, ELLIS AND MYSELF WERE GUARDING THE FRONT GATE. WHEN A SUSPICIOUS WHITE CAR KEPT DRIVING SLOWLY PAST US.AFTER A COUPLE OF TIMES OF WATCHING THIS WE DECIDED TO RADIO THROUGH TO HQ TO SEE IF WE COULD GET PERMISSION TO STOP THE VEHICLE.AFTER AN HOUR WENT BY AND THE CAR GOING PAST A FEW MORE TIMES WE GOT THE PERMISSION TO STOP IT. SO WE ALL GOT READY.I MANNED THE GPMG ON TOP OF THE 432 WHILE THE REST OF THE TEAM TOOK THEIR POSITIONS IN THE SHADOWS.EVERYONES ADRENALIN WAS PUMPING WHILE WE WERE WAITING FOR THE CAR TO COME. ATFFER WAITING FOR TEN MINUTES THE CAR APPROACHED. THE LADS SPRANG OUT OF THEIR POSITIONS WITH GREAT SPEED,RIFLES POINTING AT THE CAR. THE CAR STOPPED INSTANTLY. THEY PULLED THREE MEN OUT THE CAR AND BEGAN TO SEARCH THE CAR. ONE MAN WAS WEARING CHEST WEBBING WITH A GRANADE IN IT. THREE RIFLES WAS ALSO FOUND WITH AMMUNITION. WE RADIOED THROUGH TO HQ AND TOLD THEM WHAT WE HAD FOUND.WHILE THE REST OF THE TEAM WAS KEEPING THE THREE MEN UNDER CONTROL. HQ SENT DOWN RMP,S AND INTERGATORS TO DEAL WITH THE THREE MEN. EVERYONE ON OUR TEAM THAT NIGHT WAS RELIEVED TO HAVE CAUGHT THESE MEN AND NO DOUGHT IT WILL BE A STORY TO TELL WHEN WE GOT BACK.

Basrah Hospital with an OP on the roof



Diary of
Gnr
Stowell



Crowd control training



"He says he's only borrowing it to watch the Arsenal-United game"

Returning from a patrol

new home. On the 21st May, D Battery left Al Faw, returning to Shaibah Airfield to prepare their kit and start the process of shipping everything back to Germany. On the 22nd May, the last of C Battery left the Palace and went to Shaibah. The now reinforced J Battery took over the entire Al Faw Peninsular, running an AO with a reinforced Battery that had been the responsibility of a whole Brigade just weeks earlier. The last 5 weeks were by no means quiet or benign, with the Battery targeting criminals, former regime members and large scale smuggling. The arrest tally was high and the Battery was involved in five contacts, returning fire in four of these, including a two and a half hour firefight in Al Faw town.

During stabilisation operations, every patrol, guard or operation had its own unique incidents, which are too numerous to account, but to all there were the common threads; the sight of over laden donkey carts and small, smiling, dirty children crowding around and begging; the relief expressed at Saddam's defeat tempered with demands to know when water and electricity would be working, when they would be paid, and when we would be leaving; and, above all, the unforgiving and inescapable heat as temperatures hit 49°C in the shade.



D Battery's smuggled camels



A picture by Mathew Cook, the Times war artist showing looting with the effects of AS90 in the background



Anti looting raid at the Government factory complex



The Palace Race. Organised to help maintain fitness by Brigade HQ

HOME COMING

The war in Iraq received enormous media coverage, but returning home was a quiet affair with the Regiment steadily ebbing its way back. The first packets, those required to reorganise life in Germany, left by late April and as the rest of the Regiment settled into its Peace Support Operations, all the augmentees departed too. At the end of May the main bodies of C and D Batteries returned home leaving behind RHQ and a reinforced J(Sidi Rezegh) Battery. In late June they started to come home too. Our AO was handed over to 40 Regiment RA and the last flight landed on the morning of 1st July,

The journey home allowed individuals to relax, look around and comprehend, perhaps for the first time, what the Regiment had achieved. Whether it was the drive south from Basrah, through Safwan, passing locations that many had not visited since they had fought for them, or the border crossing, now manned by Kuwaitis, with its steady flow of American vehicles heading to Baghdad; the change was vivid. It illustrated how far the Regiment had come. Those who flew out earlier departed via the tented camps in Kuwait where the Regiment had begun its campaign. In March they had been surrounded by allied military hardware, now they stood completely isolated in a hot empty desert; but the showers worked. Those who left at the end, flew from Basrah International airport, where only weeks earlier the Regiment had fired from its apron in the Battle for Basrah.

In war the Regiment fired 9513 Rounds in 17 days of continuous firing. Every round had landed where it was ordered with no friendly fire incidents and collateral damage in Basrah minimised. Throughout the war AS90 provided timely and accurate fire, reminding the supported Arms of the effectiveness of artillery in the Combined Arms battle.

There were no brass bands or cheering crowds on our arrival. Most landed at Hanover airport, often in the early hours of the morning. They collected their bags and got on the bus. 50 minutes later, getting out at the Regimental square, the single soldiers wandered to their blocks and fell into bed or just unpacked, before returning to work 48 hours later. Married soldiers met their families, who were excited and apprehensive but ultimately relieved that the Regiment was coming home safe. At home there were then the private hellos, dreamt of over the previous months, before the returning to the routine of work. For many it was a strange anticlimax, yet for all there was an unequivocal feeling of joy to be home.



Back home with family in Hohne



Coming back into Kuwait

1st July - My last diary note and 3RHA's last flight is in. I did not expect them all to come home. We probably owe the church a visit. Allah Akbar!

Extract from the 2IC's diary.



THE ORDER OF BATTLE

The Regiment was brought to war fighting establishment with soldiers from Regular and Territorial units, they are indicated in the Order of Battle as follows:

§ = 1 Regiment Royal Horse Artillery, ◆ = 4 Regiment Royal Artillery, ¶ = 14 Regiment Royal Artillery,
 * = 26 Regiment Royal Artillery, † = 614 Tactical Air Control Party, ✦ = Territorial Army

The Order of Battle represents the Regiment for the ground war from the 20th March 2003 to the 7th April 2003.



REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS

The Commanding Officer
 Lt Col N D Ashmore OBE RHA

The Second in Command
 Maj E J Tyson RHA

The Regimental Sergeant Major
 WO1 (RSM) T P Lynn



Fire Support Co-ordination Cell

Maj P N Curtis RHA (BC)
 Capt SCR Griffiths RA *
 WO2 (BSM) Shenton
 Bdr May
 Bdr Stock
 LBdr McKenna
 Gnr Gover

Fire Direction Centre

Capt M P D Killick RHA (Adj)
 WO2 Pincock
 WO2 Scammell
 Bdr O'Hara
 LBdr Cherry
 LBdr Noden
 Gnr Turnbull

Fire Support Co-ordination Cell (Step Up)

Maj M R Elviss RA *
 WO2 (BSM) Vincent*
 Sgt Brown*
 Bdr Oaks *
 LBdr King *
 Gnr Stubbles *
 Gnr Weightman *

Fire Direction Centre (Step up)

Capt J E G Sharpe RA *
 WO2 Bennett *
 WO2 Shaw *
 Bdr Greaves *
 Gnr Brown *
 Gnr Jaques

C BATTERY RHA

TAC GROUP

Maj C R Warner RA (BC) *	Bdr Avery	LBdr Renwick ♦
Capt G Bianconi RHA	Bdr Clarke *	LBdr Reilly *
Capt T A P Hubbard 9/12 †	Bdr Dunn *	LBdr Smith
Capt G H Malec RHA	Bdr Forsyth ♦	LCpl McDonald †
Capt A W Morrison RA*	Bdr Hunt	Gnr Armstrong
Capt B L Richardson RHA	Bdr Kinghorn	Gnr Dean
Capt A W Waddie RA ♦	Bdr Torrance	Gnr Grayson *
SSgt Davies	LBdr Clark *	Gnr Hilton
Sgt Crawford †	LBdr Cotterill ♦	Gnr Holt
Sgt Hilton †	LBdr Jeffries ♦	Gnr Jones *
Sgt Walden	LBdr Jones *	Gnr Leadbeater *
Bdr Aldridge *	LBdr Lincoln †	



GUN GROUP

Capt P T Parks RHA (BK)	Bdr Staker *	Gnr Atherton	Gnr Orr
Capt R P Hart RHA (BRO)	Bdr Stapleford	Gnr Bakaniceva	Gnr Orwell
Capt W J T Strong RA *	Bdr Stevenson *	Gnr Bannister	Gnr Paige §
Lt N J M Budd RHA	Bdr Whites	Gnr Brown *	Gnr Ratcliffe
Lt V M Robb RHA	Bdr Woodward *	Gnr Bull	Gnr Ravonu
WO2 (BSM) Uttridge	Cpl Mann *	Gnr Campbell *	Gnr Richards
WO2 Harber	Cpl Swindlehurst *	Gnr Chilton *	Gnr Richards *
SSgt Conneely *	Cpl Telford-Wright (Clerk)	Gnr Crawford	Gnr Roberts
SSgt Dahlberg *	LBdr Arnold	Gnr Davison ❖	Gnr Rokobuli *
SSgt McClure	LBdr Boddy *	Gnr Dawson *	Gnr Rowell
SSgt Olsen	LBdr Causer	Gnr Dickeson *	Gnr Shaw ¶
Sgt Cameron	LBdr Chapman	Gnr Downing *	Gnr Sheppard ¶
Sgt Carden	LBdr Davis	Gnr Ellis	Gnr Smith §
Sgt Cooper *	LBdr Fetigan *	Gnr Evans *	Gnr Spender *
Sgt Evans	LBdr Fletcher *	Gnr Finegan	Gnr Stowell
Sgt Finch *	LBdr Friend	Gnr Glasgow	Gnr Stubbles *
Sgt Holborow *	LBdr Godliman *	Gnr Griffiths *	Gnr Swan *
Sgt Holloway *	LBdr Gough	Gnr Grimshaw	Gnr Sykes
Sgt Hume	LBdr Grisewood	Gnr Huggins *	Gnr Taylor *
Sgt Jordan	LBdr Helliwell ♦	Gnr Hughes	Gnr Thompson *
Sgt McDonald *	LBdr Hunter	Gnr Ingram	Gnr Thompson
Sgt Partridge *	LBdr Jones *	Gnr Johnson	Gnr Thomson *
Sgt Peake	LBdr Mitchell *	Gnr Johnston	Gnr Turner *
Sgt Pittaway	LBdr Morris	Gnr Jones	Gnr Waller
Sgt Tudor	LBdr O'Hannlon	Gnr Jones *	Gnr Walton ¶
Bdr Allgrove *	LBdr O'Connell	Gnr Joyce	Gnr Waters
Bdr Briggs	LBdr Powell *	Gnr Lane *	Pte Body (Medic)
Bdr Burr	LBdr Saunders	Gnr Maguire	Pte Lockhart
Bdr Dodd §	LBdr Wareing	Gnr McShane *	Pte Bourne ❖
Bdr Dunn *	LBdr Whitehurst	Gnr Meheut	
Bdr Elliot	LCpl Carr (Medic)	Gnr Moore *	
Bdr Hughes	LCpl Coleman ❖	Gnr Muteedzi *	
Bdr Lewis	LCpl Howard *	Gnr O'Neill	

D BATTERY RHA

TAC GROUP

Maj M R Weymouth RHA (BC)	Bdr Chappell	LBdr Pentek
Maj S A Kirkwood TD (RA(V)) †	Bdr Dixon ♦	Gnr Bresnen
Capt T M D Davies RA ♦	Bdr Hudson	Gnr Davies ♦
Capt A K Davis RHA	Bdr Mason	Gnr Green
Capt M G Edwards RHA	Bdr Wilson	Gnr Jones ♦
Capt N I Morton RHA	Cpl Reardon †	Gnr Morrison ♦
Capt A C Simons RHA	LBdr Ball-Taylor	Gnr Porter
SSgt Foalle	LBdr Dibbens *	Gnr Snowball
Sgt Harber *	LBdr Fairclough ♦	Gnr Terry
Sgt Perryment †	LBdr Guerin *	Gnr Vakalalabure
Sgt Read	LBdr Horan	Pte Bruford (RRW)
Sgt Reed	LBdr Ogley	Pte Falkenberg †
Sgt Rickett †		



GUN GROUP

Capt R S Marsh RHA (BK)	Bdr Kirk	Gnr Batikora *	Gnr McIntosh
Capt M I J Entwisle RHA(BRO)	Bdr Lindley *	Gnr Booth	Gnr Moutter ¶
Lt K J Hewitt RA *	Bdr Mitchell	Gnr Bradshaw	Gnr Navusolo *
Lt M K E Monk RHA	Bdr Norris	Gnr Breley *	Gnr Nichols
Lt A S Piper RHA	Bdr Piggott *	Gnr Brown	Gnr Norman
WO2 (BSM) Rushworth	Bdr Rampling *	Gnr Bujniewicz *	Gnr O'Neill *
WO2 Baker	Bdr Ryley *	Gnr Byrne	Gnr Owen
SSgt Butler *	Bdr Sheehan	Gnr Cartwright	Gnr Raqila
SSgt Cowan	Bdr Smith	Gnr Casey	Gnr Revell
SSgt Dickinson *	LBdr Bell	Gnr Catherwood *	Gnr Saggerson
Sgt MacLean (BQMS)	LBdr Blackett	Gnr Clayton	Gnr Schnaar *
Sgt Brain *	LBdr Collins	Gnr Collins	Gnr Shaw *
Sgt Fitzsimmons	LBdr Cowan	Gnr Collins	Gnr Shone *
Sgt Freeman *	LBdr Dunn	Gnr Coplin	Gnr Slater
Sgt Grigg	LBdr Everitt ¶	Gnr Dutton *	Gnr Smith
Sgt Hobbs	LBdr Garside *	Gnr Edwards	Gnr Staley *
Sgt Hutchinson ¶	LBdr Hacker	Gnr Edwards *	Gnr Stephenson *
Sgt Platt	LBdr Hayton	Gnr Elson	Gnr Stewart ❖
Sgt Rogerson	LBdr Jennings *	Gnr Finnigan	Gnr Stokes
Sgt Sumner *	LBdr Lomas *	Gnr Fletcher *	Gnr Tabutabu *
Sgt Thorpe	LBdr Mahoney *	Gnr Harcombe *	Gnr Thomson
Sgt Vickers ¶	LBdr McCormick *	Gnr Holman ¶	Gnr Tierney
Sgt Watson	LBdr Rolling *	Gnr Hume	Gnr Toner
Bdr Allison	LBdr Tanton	Gnr Johnson *	Gnr Whittaker
Bdr Arrowsmith	LBdr Tomkinson *	Gnr Jones	Gnr Wilson *
Bdr Bardwell ❖	LBdr Warwicker *	Gnr Jones *	Pte Jewitt (Medic)
Bdr Catterick	LBdr Whatton	Gnr Latham *	Pte Southern ❖
Bdr Clark	LBdr Williams *	Gnr Lawley *	
Bdr Danville ¶	LCpl Chamberlain (Clerk)	Gnr Lopez *	
Bdr Goddard	LCpl Goodman * (Medic)	Gnr Mahmood	
Bdr Goldthorpe *	Gnr Albison	Gnr Mangan	
Bdr Greasley	Gnr Balmforth *	Gnr McDermott	
Bdr Irvine	Gnr Bashford	Gnr McEvoy *	

J (Sidi Rezegh) BATTERY RHA

TAC GROUP

Maj I R Bell RHA (BC)	Bdr Robinson *
Capt C Gent RA *	Bdr Ross *
Capt J B M Hurst RHA	Bdr Wilkins *
Capt J E Mardlin RA*	Cpl Cuthbertson †
Capt D K Smith RHA	Cpl Young †
Capt P A Whitbread RA	LBdr Baker
Flt Lt D Finch †	LBdr Jefferson
SSgt Auld	LBdr Killet
Sgt Jowers †	LBdr Kitchener
Sgt Wattam	LBdr McMillan
Bdr Cox	LBdr Potts
Bdr Harding *	LBdr Press *
Bdr Hardman	LBdr Riley

GUN GROUP

Capt J N Kemp RHA (BK)	Bdr Skeet *
Capt R T Oldfield (BRO)	Bdr Speirs *
Lt T N Clarke RA *	Bdr Taylor *
Lt V E Deakin RHA	Bdr Thomson *
Lt S E Harris RHA	Bdr Vince *
Lt M J Rigby RA *	Bdr Wallace
WO2 Belam	Cpl Elliot †
WO2 Booth	LBdr Brown *
WO2 Mill *	LBdr Coxon
SSgt Bannister *	L.Cpl Dargie †
SSgt Miller	LBdr Fletcher
Sgt Allsopp	L.Cpl French †
Sgt Bannister	LBdr Keefe
Sgt Cooper	LBdr McCullough *
Sgt Cork	LBdr Miller
Sgt Crowson	L.Cpl O'Conner †
Sgt Dubarick †	LBdr Rea †
Sgt Gray *	LBdr Richens
Sgt Middleton	LBdr Sarmon-Courtney *
Sgt Ray	LBdr Shingelston †
Sgt Thomas *	LBdr Tear *
Sgt Turnbull	LBdr Turley-Smith *
Bdr Calver †	LBdr Weir
Bdr Chadwick	L.Cpl Cooke (Clerk)
Bdr Cooney	L.Cpl Davies (Medic)
Bdr Fernandes *	L.Cpl Eaton †
Bdr Fletcher	Gnr Andrews *
Bdr Foister	Gnr Baxter †
Bdr Giaconni *	Gnr Billman
Bdr Haylock *	Gnr Birch
Bdr Hudson	Gnr Burgess
Bdr Jefferson	Gnr Cawthorne *

Gnr Basey
Gnr Blatcher *
Gnr Flynn
Gnr Greenwood *
Gnr Jones
Gnr Mathews *
Gnr Penny
Gnr Southall *
Gnr Sweeney
Gnr Wood *
Pte Jones †

Gnr Cregg	Gnr Mokiti
Gnr Cullen *	Gnr Montrose
Gnr Cuthbert	Gnr Morgan
Gnr Deveraux-	Gnr Murray *
Lovelady	Gnr O'Hanlon *
Gnr Donovan *	Gnr Pierce
Gnr Draper	Gnr Pilling
Gnr Druli Druli *	Gnr Plummer
Gnr Eldon †	Gnr Prior
Gnr Esposito *	Gnr Rataqa
Gnr Fenn-Jones †	Gnr Reed *
Gnr Forsyth	Gnr Sennett *
Gnr Fysal	Gnr Sims
Gnr Greenfield	Gnr Sparrow *
Gnr Gray *	Gnr Stirrat
Gnr Hessey	Gnr Sutton
Gnr Holme	Gnr Tikomalipanoni *
Gnr Howard	Gnr Thomas
Gnr Hunter *	Gnr Tomkins
Gnr Hunter *	Gnr Tromans *
Gnr Issacs *	Gnr Twine *
Gnr Kingston	Gnr Vukinawasawasa *
Gnr Koliloa	Gnr Walsh
Gnr Lafferty	Gnr Warburton
Gnr Lindsay *	Gnr Williams *
Gnr Mallon *	Gnr Wilson
Gnr Mathews	Gnr York
Gnr Mukanza*	Pte Kelliher (Medic)
Gnr McCarthy	Pte Tawake *
Gnr McGuigan	
Gnr McKnabb *	
Gnr Mitchel *	



M(HQ) BATTERY RHA

MAIN

Capt IB Duncan RA*	Gne Hodgkinson
Capt T C Greaney RA*	Gnr Jones *
Capt S M Harfoot RA*	Gnr Kay
Capt S Pinkney RA*	Gnr Kingston
Capt P Redgrave RHA	Gnr Kovolgyi *
WO2 Piacentini *	Gnr Mutch
SSgt Dunn	Gnr Patrick
SSgt Holgate	Gnr Shoebottom
SSgt Norris	Gnr Willis
Sgt Baker *	
Sgt Brown *	
Sgt Denton	
Sgt Devonport *	
Sgt Hamer	
Sgt Kenny	
Sgt Madden †	
Sgt Metcalfe	
Sgt Murray	
Sgt Pitcairn *	
Sgt Searle *	
Bdr Rylance	
Bdr Boston *	
Bdr Darroch *	
Bdr Devanny *	
Bdr Fayers	
Bdr Oakes *	
Bdr Sharpe *	
Bdr White *	
Bdr Whitehead*	
Bdr Young*	
LBdr Ankers	
LBdr Ashton*	
LBdr Blatcher *	
LBdr Christie *	
LBdr Cogley	
LBdr Jeffs	
LBdr Leake *	
LBdr Mercer *	
LBdr Millward	
LBdr Robinson	
LBdr Savage	
LBdr Sinclair	
LBdr Varley	
LCpl Brown	
LCpl McAuliffe	
Gnr Bourne *	
Gnr Graham *	
Gnr Hamblin	
Gnr Higgins	

A2 ECHELON

Maj A Durrant MBE RHA (QM)
WO2 (RQMS) Walkin
WO2 Thomas-Knowles
SSgt Ray
SSgt McDonald
Sgt Black †
Sgt Campbell *
Sgt Clewer
Sgt Dixon
Sgt Jones
Sgt Lyon
Sgt Owen *
Sgt Smith
Sgt Whyman
Bdr Callaghan
Bdr Green
Bdr North
Bdr Sydenham
Bdr Syron Jones
Bdr Witherow
Cpl Pedley
LBdr Gregg
LBdr Jacobs
LBdr Luscombe
LCpl Hardy †
LCpl Jones
LCpl Meldris
LCpl Powell*
LCpl Trevor
Gnr Agboutsu *
Gnr Deakin
Gnr Decming *
Gnr Fannon
Gnr Greathead *
Gnr Henderson
Gnr Johnstone *
Gnr Littlewood

A1 ECHELON (ACP)

Capt J S Trench RHA (QM(T))
WO2 (RQMS(T)) Robinson
WO2 Carre
Sgt Thomas *
Bdr Clarke *
Bdr Mellors *
Bdr Wright
Gnr Brown *
Gnr Day *
Gnr Jones *
Gnr Nixon *
Pte Brammah *

B ECHELON

Capt E E Grafton AGC(SPS) (RAO)
Capt S M Brunskill AGC(SPS)
Capt D P Penniall MBE BEM RHA
WO2 (SQMS) Johns
WO2 (SQMS) Milton
Sgt Maw
Sgt Wetherell
Cpl Dunleavy *
Cpl Hughes
Cpl Trezise
LCpl Culley *
Pte Gibbs *
Pte McAllister

RAP (supported by ICMRS)

Capt A T Forbes RAMC (RMO)
Padre Brown
Sgt Clarke * (Med Sgt)
Sgt Bee *
Bdr Fernyhough
Cpl Maxwell
LCpl Wescombe *
LBdr Garstang
Gnr Semak *



17/16 BATTERY RA*

TAC GROUP

Maj G Cole RA (BC) Bdr Hilton
 Capt CPM Anderson RA Bdr Lewis
 Capt EN Cornes RA Bdr Smyth
 Capt K Fox RA Bdr Wileman
 Capt JL Power RA LBdr Brandon
 Capt SJ Shepherd RA LBdr Evans
 SSgt Burns LBdr Goodwin
 Sgt Baker LBdr Hall
 Sgt Denby LBdr Hogg
 Bdr Bigg LBdr May
 LBdr Moon

GUN GROUP

Capt A O'Rourke RA (BK) Bdr Howarth
 Capt C Holland RA (BRO) Bdr Lewis
 Lt H Beven RA Bdr Ling
 Lt G Donohoe RA Bdr Littlewood
 2Lt J Howard RA Bdr Marland
 2Lt B Watson RA Cpl Marples
 WO2(BSM) Parsonage Bdr Parr
 WO2(BSM) Wilson Bdr Springall
 WO2 Arch Bdr Stoddart
 SSgt Barker Cpl Syme (Medic)
 SSgt Connor Bdr Tomlinson
 SSgt Woods Bdr Woodhouse
 Sgt Campbell Bdr Wileman
 Sgt Evans Bdr Williams
 Sgt Felton Bdr Williamson
 Sgt Fowler LBdr Adams
 Sgt Gearing LBdr Bell
 Sgt Keane LBdr Boddy
 Sgt Oldfield LCpl Brand
 Sgt Saxon LBdr Campbell
 Sgt Steward LBdr Coleman
 Sgt Taylor LBdr Coulson
 Sgt Webster LBdr Davenport
 Sgt Weyman LBdr Eardley
 Bdr Allen LBdr Fenn
 Bdr Baxter LBdr Fetigen
 Bdr Behan LBdr Gunnell
 Bdr Bulmer LBdr Guina
 Bdr Bunce LBdr Hancox
 Bdr Crabbe LBdr Hart
 Bdr Cowan LBdr Hawkes
 Bdr Evans LCpl Hopkins
 Bdr Giles LBdr Hunnybell

LBdr Johnson Gnr Mallon
 LBdr McNeil Gnr Milburn
 LBdr Parry Gnr Murphy
 LBdr Smith Gnr Murphy
 LBdr Stewart Gnr Oldham
 LBdr Stones Gnr Pearson
 LBdr Sullivan Gnr Racule
 LBdr Whalley Gnr Reed
 LBdr Whelan Gnr Roberts
 LBdr Wolstenholme Gnr Salt
 Gnr Addison Gnr Sanders
 Gnr Antonio Gnr Saqanavere
 Gnr Boddy Gnr Shaw
 Gnr Booth Gnr Shilling
 Gnr Buttress Gnr Skipp
 Gnr Cama Gnr Snelson
 Gnr Chase Gnr Stallard
 Pte Chester Gnr Sturgess
 Gnr Common Gnr Suguvanua
 Gnr Connor Gnr Sutton
 Gnr Colati Gnr Swift
 Gnr Craggs Gnr Tannock
 Gnr Croft Gnr Tatton
 Gnr Garland Gnr Trickett
 Pte Gibbs Gnr Twigg
 Gnr Johnson Gnr Tyson
 Gnr Hanley Gnr Unwin
 Gnr Kerby Gnr Watson
 Gnr Latham Gnr Webb
 Gnr Liddle Gnr Willoughby
 Gnr McCain Gnr Wood
 Pte McCaig
 Gnr Maze

LBdr Thorn
 LBdr Varley
 Gnr Carter
 Gnr Cooper
 Gnr Gilbert
 Gnr Hazel
 Gnr Hendin
 Gnr Kilcaldie
 Gnr Kingston
 Gnr Millar
 Gnr Wright



SANDHAM'S
XVI



XVII

WORKSHOP

MAIN

Capt C H W Moffat REME
 2Lt S Baker REME
 WO1(ASM) Hawkins
 WO2 Hall
 WO2 Wilson
 SSgt Hill *
 SSgt Farwell ❖
 SSgt Peters
 SSgt Smith
 Sgt Amos
 Sgt Beswick ❖
 Sgt Harmon
 Sgt Mackie
 Sgt Pink
 Sgt Roberts
 Sgt Sterry *
 Sgt Thomson
 Sgt Tomlinson
 Sgt Wilde
 Cpl Dickinson ❖
 Cpl Ferguson
 Cpl Gordon
 Cpl Haslam ❖
 Cpl Hawkins ❖
 Cpl Hodge
 Cpl Lancaster ❖
 Cpl Mellors *
 Cpl Murphy
 Cpl Nicol
 Cpl Parry
 Cpl Roc *
 Cpl Stacey ❖
 Cpl Stevenson
 Cpl Wilkie ❖
 LCpl Anderson
 LCpl Cresswell
 LCpl Gall *
 LCpl Green
 LCpl Hart
 LCpl Kidd
 Cfn Carapiet
 Cfn Davies
 Cfn Dean
 Cfn Dye ❖
 Cfn Gunn
 Cfn Hughes
 Cfn Kane *
 Cfn Mangweza
 Cfn Shipp *
 Pte Harris
 Pte Le-Roux

C BTY

FITTER SECTION

SSgt Davies
 SSgt Steele
 Sgt Cutler
 Sgt Goodall
 Sgt Kitchen *
 Cpl Goldsack ❖
 Cpl Owen *
 Cpl Simpson *
 Cpl Smythson
 Cpl Warry
 LCpl Hutchinson
 LCpl Morton *
 LCpl Sanderson
 LCpl Thorburn
 Cfn Bradshaw
 Cfn Edwards*
 Cfn Gillings
 Cfn Robinson
 Cfn Tutaj *

D BTY

FITTER SECTION

SSgt Egglestone
 Sgt Catterall *
 Sgt Gisby *
 Sgt Webdale *
 Cpl Dunbar
 Cpl Gilbert §
 Cpl Hartley *
 Cpl Horsman
 Cpl Rogers
 LCpl Ball
 LCpl Gibbs
 LCpl Lusty
 LCpl Nightingale
 LCpl Wills *
 Cfn Crehans *
 Cfn Eaton *
 Cfn Field*
 Cfn Hunt
 Cfn Vant *
 Cfn Woodward

J BTY

FITTER SECTION

SSgt Nixon
 Sgt Butcher
 Sgt Longley ❖
 Sgt McGowan *
 Sgt Parsons
 Cpl Brown
 Cpl Elliott ❖
 Cpl Hooper *
 Cpl Reynolds
 LCpl Davies *
 LCpl Marshman
 LCpl Russell *
 LCpl Sidwell
 LCpl Turton
 LCpl Williams *
 Cfn Boyle §
 Cfn Hamilton
 Cfn Newhouse *
 Cfn Patrick
 Cfn Thomson
 Cfn Woolnough *

17/16 BTY

FITTER SECTION*

SSgt Merrin
 Sgt Bird
 Sgt Entwistle
 Sgt Webster
 Cpl Cudmore
 Cpl Evans
 Cpl Heale
 Cpl Jordan
 LCpl Glynn
 LCpl Goff
 LCpl Gunn
 LCpl Lerhle
 LCpl Price
 Cfn Aylott
 Cfn Brand
 Cfn Campbell
 Cfn Jackson
 Cfn Simpson
 Cfn Smith
 Cfn Turner
 Cfn Ward



REAR PARTY

Capt M J Birch RHA (OC)
 Capt P S McCaffrey RHA (Adj)
 2Lt M E Brockesby RHA
 (Deployed PSO)
 2Lt R A Skeggs RHA
 (Deployed PSO)
 WO2 Heap
 SSgt Dewey
 SSgt Shaw
 SSgt Simpson
 SSgt Tebbutt
 SSgt Wyatt
 Sgt Atkin
 Sgt Hadfield
 Sgt McKay
 Sgt More (Deployed PSO)
 Sgt Tilson
 Sgt Waugh
 Sgt Wymark
 Bdr Bashford
 Bdr McIntyre
 Bdr Maxwell
 Sgt Ware (Deployed PSO)
 Bdr Winton
 LBdr Hughes (Deployed PSO)
 Cpl Cook
 Cpl Nolan
 Cpl Scurr
 Cpl Verdon
 LBdr McFarlane
 LCpl Carr
 LCpl Bolton
 LCpl Brown
 LCpl Doyle
 LCpl Gardiner
 LCpl MacDonald
 LCpl McCleods-Needs
 Gnr Barstow
 Gnr Bloy
 Gnr Bouttell
 Gnr Brannon
 Gnr Chalmers
 Gnr Draper
 Gnr Garstang
 Gnr Henry
 Gnr Hayton
 Gnr Jaycocks
 Gnr Jefferson (Deployed PSO)
 Gnr Knaggs
 Gnr Loughin

Gnr Lloyd
 Gnr Merrigan
 Gnr Rose (Deployed PSO)
 Gnr Sherrington
 Gnr Smith
 Gnr Smyth
 Gnr Snee
 Gnr Temple
 Gnr Webb (Deployed PSO)
 Gnr Williams (Deployed PSO)
 Cfn Bygarves
 Cfn Coleman
 Cfn Short
 Pte Harris
 Pte Kay
 Pte McAllister
 Pte Taylor
 Capt JP Cresswell RHA
 (Deployed PSO, Adjt designate)
 WO1 (RSM) Quigley PM
 (Deployed PSO, RSM designate)
 WO2 (BSM) Bleakly P
 (Deployed PSO, BSM M(HQ) Bty designate)

RECORD OF ROUNDS FIRED					
Ammunition	HE	Bomblet	Smoke	Illum	
	L15	L20	DM105	DM106	
Total					
C Battery	1583	580	0	141	2304
D Battery	1661	830	135	204	2830
J Battery	1786	500	2	171	2459
17/16 Battery	1469	188	61	202	1920
Regimental Total	6499	2108	198	818	9513

Honours and Awards

The following honours and awards were awarded to members of 3 RHA Artillery Group and cover the period of warfighting up to 1 May 03.

Officer of the Order of the British Empire (OBE)
 Lt Col N D Ashmore RHA

Member of the Order of the British Empire (MBE)
 Maj A Durrant RHA

Mention in Dispatches (MiD)
 Capt J L Power RA
 Capt P A Whitbread RHA

Queen's Commendation for Valuable Service (QCVS)
 Maj E J Tyson RHA
 Maj I R Bell RHA
 Capt T A P Hubbard 9/12L
 Capt T C Holland RA
 Lt S E Harris RHA

Joint Force Commander's Commendation
 Gnr C R Plummer

Commander in Chief's Commendation
 Capt M J Birch RHA

Brigade Commander's Commendation
 WO2 Heap
 Bdr B Briggs
 Bdr M C Hardman
 Bdr J D Wilson
 LBdr L J Arnold
 LBdr A P Dunn
 LBdr H C S Grisewood (now Bdr)
 LCpl J Lusty
 LBdr J J Clayton
 Gnr S R Bull (now LBdr)
 Gnr A C Bradshaw
 Pte D McAllister

A further honours list for peace support operations will be published in 2004.

Appendix 2 Glossary

- Op FRESCO was the name given for the relief of fire fighting duties by the Army.
- Orbats - Order of Battle, the "team list" for war.
- Ops Officer - The principle staff officer in the production of plans and Battle orders.
- QM - The Quarter Master.
- Sanitisation, this involved the removal of all personal belongings and letters that could be used to coerce, intimidate or threaten a soldier in the event of capture by the enemy.
- Gun Group - The largest part of the Battery consisting of, the Guns, their limbers, the command posts and ammunition.
- Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) - an area for battle preparation to be conducted within enemy indirect fire range.
- NAPS - Nerve Agent Pre-treatment set, tablets taken to help combat the effects of nerve agent in an NBC attack.
- FDC - Fire Direction Cell, the command and control centre for the Regimental gun group where all fire orders are processed.
- AMA - Artillery Manoeuvre Area, an area of 4 square kilometres.
- TAC Group - The tactical group, of the Battery composed of the BC and forward observers of a Battery, deployed within the Battle Groups.
- Forward Assembly Area (FAA) - an area for final administration and battle preparation, to be conducted out of indirect fire from the enemy.
- Zhrs - Greenwich Mean Time.
- ARA - Artillery Reserved Area, an area of 1 square km exclusively for the use of artillery.
- A2 Echelon - formed of the QM's Department with the possible additions of Workshops and Regimental Aid Post (RAP).
- Tactical HQ - the mobile forward command elements of a headquarters.
- HETs - Heavy Equipment Transporters, big lorries to move armoured vehicles.
- RPGs - Rocket Propelled Grenades.
- FSSC - Fire Support Co-ordination Cell, the Commanding Officer's operational headquarters with staff that co-ordinate, on his behalf, all offensive support²⁶ for the brigade.
- AA missile - Anti Aircraft missile.
- PGM - Precision Guided Munitions, eg a JDAM.
- RTO - Regimental Training Officer.
- SIGINT - intelligence gathered by radio or electronic means.
- Psyops - operations aimed at engaging the enemy by physiological means.
- QRF - Quick Reaction Force.
- Offensive Support - all indirect fire weapons and non-weapon systems including artillery, munitions, air, PGM, offensive electronic weapons and psyops.

Appendix 3

RO Defence Weapon Systems - Proven in the Heat of Battle



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RO Defence supplies integrated weapon systems worldwide. The company specialises in providing fire-power solutions - from the fire platform to explosive munition effects. Proven in the heat of battle RO Defence has the pedigree and breadth of capability to deliver winning systems.

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